The Cost of Non-Compensable Workplace Harm by Chambers, Henry L., Jr
FIU Law Review 
Volume 8 Number 2 Article 7 
Spring 2013 
The Cost of Non-Compensable Workplace Harm 
Henry L. Chambers Jr 
University of Richmond 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Other Law Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Henry L. Chambers Jr, The Cost of Non-Compensable Workplace Harm, 8 FIU L. Rev. 317 (2013). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU 
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
317 
The Cost of Non-Compensable Workplace Harm 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The achievement gap between men and women in the workplace 
in 2013 is real.1  Women earn less money than men and continue to lag 
in positions of power and prestige.2  Though women continue to enter 
the workplace in greater numbers3 and are more welcome in the 
workplace than ever,4 men continue to enjoy better prospects in the 
workplace than women.5  Why the achievement gap persists given how 
far working women have come since the 1960s seems a mystery.6  An 
achievement gap seems at odds with the progress made over the near-
ly 50 years since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (Title VII).  However, Title VII’s continued enforcement is not 
inconsistent with a gender achievement gap because Title VII has a 
coverage gap.  Title VII does not cover all workplace behavior that 
                                                                                                                           
 * Professor of Law, University of Richmond.  Professor Chambers wishes to thank all 
involved with the planning and execution of the Symposium.  
 1 See MADELEINE M. KUNIN, THE NEW FEMINIST AGENDA 182-87 (2012) (discussing the 
gender wage and achievement gap).  However, some argue that the gap is closing or has closed.  
See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Deliverable Male, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 733, 737-38 (2011) (discuss-
ing claims of a diminishing gender pay gap). 
 2 See Debra Barbezat, Occupational Segregation Around the World, in WOMEN, FAMILY 
AND WORK 177, 191 (Karine S. Moe ed., 2003); THOMAS A. KOCHAN, RESTORING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 20 (2005) (discussing gender wage gap).  The Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84, 
113th Cong. (2013), is an attempt to help resolve the gender wage gap.   
 3 See KOCHAN, supra note 2, at 17-18 (noting the continued increase of women in the 
workforce); KUNIN, supra note 1, at 6; Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 734.  
 4 See The Harried Life of the Working Mother, PEW RES. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
PROJECT (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/10/01/the-harried-life-of-the-
working-mother/ (discussing changing attitudes toward working women and working mothers in 
the last few decades). 
 5 See KOCHAN, supra note 2, at 20 (noting a gender promotion gap); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, 
RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE 15 (2010) (noting that women may still experience a 
promotions glass ceiling). 
 6 See Joyce P. Jacobsen, The Human Capital Explanation for the Gender Gap in Earnings, 
in WOMEN, FAMILY AND WORK 161-74 (Karine S. Moe ed., 2003) (noting that the existence of 
the gender gap is somewhat of a puzzlement for economists). 
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can harm women’s advancement in the workplace.7  Consequently, if 
women are more likely to be subjected to non-compensable work-
place behavior that can harm an employee’s achievement than men 
are, Title VII’s coverage gap makes the gender achievement gap pre-
dictable.8  
Title VII has helped women in the workplace, but it does not cure 
all workplace ills.  Passed, in part, to provide equality for women in 
the workplace, Title VII bars sex discrimination.9  However, Title VII is 
an employment statute that focuses on harm to employment, and pri-
marily on harm to an employee’s compensation, or terms, conditions 
or privileges (TCP) of employment.10  Remedying discrimination that 
harms an individual’s TCP of employment is important, but does not 
address the full range of behavior that can harm an employee’s em-
ployment or advancement.  Title VII covers a broad spectrum of em-
ployment discrimination, but does not compensate for various forms 
of workplace harm that may stop an employee from reaching the em-
ployee’s potential.11 
Title VII’s coverage gap has been made broader by judicial inter-
pretations of Title VII.  Courts are not necessarily hostile to Title VII.  
However, some may interpret Title VII narrowly precisely because 
Title VII’s language explicitly bars only some workplace harm.12  For 
example, though sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, 
courts have interpreted Title VII to cover some, but not all, sexually 
harassing workplace conduct.  Sexually harassing conduct that is not 
severe or pervasive enough to affect an employee’s TCP of employ-
ment is not covered.13   
Indeed, even when courts deem Title VII to cover some work-
place behavior that may not affect an employee’s TCP of employment 
explicitly, Title VII typically will not be interpreted to cover all behav-
ior that can harm an employee.  For example, retaliation may be ac-
                                                                                                                           
 7 Title VII is the focus of this short essay, though the point applies to the broad range of 
employment discrimination statutes. 
 8 See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias:  On Devaluation and 
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2001) (noting Title VII’s coverage gap). 
 9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  
 10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
. . . to discriminate against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”). 
 11 See Jonah Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Lesley Wexler, Passive Discrimination:  When 
Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 824-26 (2009) (noting Title VII’s 
general limitations). 
 12 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (noting that Title VII is 
not supposed to be a “civility code” that makes every workplace slight actionable). 
 13 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (discussing requirements for 
actionable sexual harassment). 
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tionable under Title VII, even when it does not explicitly alter the TCP 
of an employee’s employment.  However, retaliation that may harm 
an employee will not be covered by Title VII if it is deemed insuffi-
ciently severe to deter an employee from challenging an unlawful em-
ployment practice.14  Though the harms from uncovered retaliation 
may damage an employee’s productivity or impair an employee’s ad-
vancement, Title VII does not address that conduct.  Whether or not 
the courts are correct in their interpretations of Title VII, those inter-
pretations suggest that substantial non-compensable workplace harm 
exists.  If non-compensable workplace harm is visited on women more 
often than on men, a persistent achievement gap should be expected. 
In addition to limiting Title VII’s substantive reach, courts have 
limited Title VII’s effective coverage through procedural rulings.  The 
courts have shaped proof issues that make victory more difficult for 
Title VII plaintiffs.  For example, courts grant summary judgment in 
cases that ought to be determined by a factfinder.15  These decisions on 
procedural issues are not designed to harm women, but they effective-
ly limit Title VII’s remedial scope.  Again, if workplace behavior tends 
to harm women more than men, the judicial response helps to explain 
the achievement gap. 
This essay briefly addresses the limited fashion in which Title VII 
remedies sex discrimination in the workplace.  Those limitations fall 
into three broad categories.  The first encompasses how courts have 
applied procedural rules to Title VII claims.  The second involves Title 
VII’s explicit limitation on its coverage.  The third includes substantive 
limitations that courts have placed on causes of action that are clearly 
covered by Title VII.  This essay addresses those categories in turn. 
II. PROCEDURAL RULES AND TITLE VII UNDERENFORCEMENT  
Procedural rules can effectively limit Title VII enforcement and 
leave some workplace discrimination non-compensable.  For example, 
federal courts effectively use summary judgment to rid the court sys-
tem of employment discrimination cases they believe are relatively 
weak.16  By applying or misapplying the Supreme Court’s summary 
judgment jurisprudence to employment discrimination cases, courts 
are eliminating winnable employment discrimination cases.  Some of 
those cases will involve a claim of unlawful discrimination that a court 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  
 15 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication Principles in Disparate 
Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103 (2005).  
 16 Scholars have suggested this for years.  See generally, id.; Ann McGinley, Credulous 
Courts and the Tortured Trilogy:  The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and 
ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993). 
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deems difficult to prove, though likely not impossible to prove to a 
jury’s satisfaction.17  If women tend to be more subject than men to 
discrimination that is dismissed because courts deem it difficult to 
prove, the subsequent underenforcement of Title VII will tend to help 
explain an achievement gap. 
When used properly, summary judgment resolves cases that do 
not need to be heard by a jury because there is no role for the jury.  
Summary judgment is appropriate when a case has no issues of mate-
rial fact for which a jury’s wisdom is required.18  In such cases, a trial is 
unnecessary because there is no dispute regarding the facts that mat-
ter to the ultimate decision.19  In such a case, a reasonable jury could 
reach only one conclusion, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant.  
Similarly, cases that are proper for summary judgment should not re-
quire the weighing of evidence.20  If evidence is to be weighed, a jury is 
necessary.21  Lastly, cases that are proper for summary judgment 
should not require credibility determinations.22  If credibility determi-
nations need be made, a jury is necessary.23  Summary judgment is ap-
propriate only when the jury has no role to play. 
When used improperly, summary judgment disposes of cases that 
should be decided by a factfinder.24  Rather than limit summary judg-
ment to cases where juries can serve no role, some courts have decid-
ed that relatively weak cases that would seem to require that 
                                                                                                                           
 17 However, even weak cases should survive summary judgment.  See Wirtz v. Kan. Farm 
Bureau Servs., Inc. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1202 (D. Kan. 2003) (“The policy disfavoring pre-trial 
disposition of employment discrimination claims makes it difficult for the court to grant sum-
mary judgment even in what appears to be this relatively weak case.”). 
 18 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”). 
 19 When a case could be decided in either party’s favor, summary judgment should not be 
available. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“More important for 
present purposes, summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ 
that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.”). 
 20 See id. at 255.  
 21 Id. at 249 (noting that judge should not weigh evidence when deciding summary judg-
ment).  
 22 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Hunt v. 
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552-53 (1999) (noting the inappropriateness of making credibility de-
terminations at summary judgment stage). 
 23 See Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green:  The High 
Court Muddies The Evidentiary Waters In Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 
385, 433-34 (1994) (noting the need to leave credibility determinations to juries in employment 
discrimination cases). 
 24 See Sheriff v. Midwest Health Partners, P.C., 619 F.3d 923, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2010) (discuss-
ing sufficiency of evidence in sexual harassment case); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of 
Summary Judgment:  Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 753 (2007) 
(discussing possible improper use of summary judgment in employment cases). 
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factfinders make inferences that the judge is unwilling to make should 
be disposed of without being tried to a jury.25  This may result from 
twisting the suggestion that summary judgment is appropriate in cases 
where no reasonable jury could properly find for one of the parties to 
mean that summary judgment is appropriate whenever a judge be-
lieves that a case is so weak that a reasonable jury will likely find for a 
particular party.  Given that federal judges may analyze cases differ-
ently than juries, summary judgment would seem particularly prob-
lematic in some such cases.26  What appears to be a relatively weak 
case to a federal judge may not be a weak case when presented to a 
jury.  
An approach to summary judgment that allows judges to analyze 
inferential evidence at the summary judgment stage may have an out-
sized effect in the employment discrimination area.  Employment dis-
crimination cases often require that factfinders make inferences, in 
part, because discrimination is often not explicit.27  Inferences based 
on circumstantial evidence may be just as powerful as conclusions 
based on direct evidence.28  However, if courts weigh evidence and 
conclude that circumstantial evidence tends to be weaker than direct 
evidence, they may dispose of too many cases on summary judgment.  
A court that decides that a case it believes to be weak should leave 
the system may be more likely to end a meritorious case in the em-
ployment discrimination area than it would be in other areas of the 
law where inferences may be less likely to be at the core of a case. 
The structure of many Title VII cases may make them particularly 
susceptible to summary judgment in courts skeptical of inferential 
proof of discrimination.  In McDonnell Douglas v. Green29, the Su-
preme Court provided the basic three-part structure of a typical Title 
VII case to address issues related to inferential evidence in Title VII 
cases.30  The familiar three-part structure begins with a plaintiff-
                                                                                                                           
 25 Chambers, supra note 15, at 111-14 (discussing quantum of evidence courts have re-
quired that non-movant produce to avoid summary judgment).  
 26 See Theresa M. Beiner, Let The Jury Decide:  The Gap Between What Judges and Rea-
sonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791 (2002). 
 27 For articles discussing unconscious discrimination, see Melissa Hart, Subjective 
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Charles R. Law-
rence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 317 (1987); Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
1431 (2012). 
 28 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (ruling that either direct or circum-
stantial evidence could be sufficient to support a discrimination verdict for plaintiff). 
 29 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 30 For a detailed discussion of the McDonnell Douglas three-part test, see Henry L. Cham-
bers, Jr., Getting It Right:  Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 
ALB. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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employee proving a prima face case that provides a factual basis from 
which a factfinder can infer discrimination.  That step is followed by 
an articulation of non-discriminatory reasons by the defendant-
employer that provides a basis for the factfinder to decline to infer or 
to reject discrimination as a cause of the adverse employment action.  
The pretext stage is the final part of the test.  During that stage, the 
employee can present evidence that would allow the factfinder to in-
fer that discrimination, not the reasons proffered by the employer, is 
the real reason for the adverse job action.  Pretext assumes  that if the 
employer has no reason for the employment action, a factfinder can 
infer that discrimination caused the employment action. 
The McDonnell Douglas test has undergone changes since its in-
ception.  Indeed, the test arguably is now nothing more than a struc-
ture that guarantees that the factfinder analyzes the precise role that 
discrimination played in the adverse employment decision.31  Howev-
er, the core of the test—the employee’s presentation of evidence from 
which the factfinder may infer discrimination—has not changed.  
What arguably has changed is the skepticism of judges toward dis-
crimination claims. 
That skepticism has been on display since the Supreme Court de-
cided St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.32  In that case, the Court decid-
ed that even after an employee has convinced a factfinder that the 
reasons an employer has given for its job action is false, a factfinder 
can still find for the employer based on vaguely stated non-
discriminatory reasons.33  At least since Hicks, and arguably well be-
fore, courts have felt free to question how much proof is necessary or 
sufficient to allow a factfinder to infer discrimination.  Indeed, Hicks 
arguably ushered in an era in which courts are allowed to require that 
a plaintiff have very good evidence of discrimination before the court 
will allow a case to survive summary judgment.34  When such skepti-
cism meets a summary judgment standard that has been applied to 
eliminate weak but winnable cases, the result is fewer successful cas-
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000) (suggesting 
that the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting structure becomes irrelevant once the parties have 
presented their cases). 
 32 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 33 See id. at 542 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Hicks majority allowed a factfinder 
to credit a reason that had not been articulated by an employer to defeat a discrimination claim).  
 34 Indeed, some courts require substantial evidence before allowing a plaintiff to prevail.  
For a discussion of courts that ignore or dismiss significant evidence that ought to support an 
inference of discrimination, see Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking In Strays:  A Critique of the Stray 
Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149 (2012). 
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es.35  The result is a jurisprudence that limits winning cases to strong 
cases.  When weak but winnable cases are declared to be losers before 
they can be argued to a jury, the discrimination underlying weak but 
winnable cases will tend to go unpunished.  If that discrimination 
tends to harm female employees more than male employees, a sex-
based achievement gap is no surprise. 
III. EXPLICIT LIMITATIONS ON TITLE VII’S COVERAGE 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a civil rights statute; Title VII is 
the employment discrimination portion of the statute.  Consequently, 
Title VII addresses workplace discrimination that causes harm to an 
employee’s employment.  Title VII, inter alia, prohibits sex discrimina-
tion by an employer when that discrimination affects the TCP of an 
employee’s employment.36  Discriminatory workplace behavior that 
does not directly affect an employee’s TCP of employment or com-
pensation usually cannot be redressed by Title VII.  Similarly, behavior 
that cannot be clearly defined as sex discrimination, but which may be 
related to sex, may be non-compensable.  These explicit limitations 
embedded in Title VII reflect a coverage gap that may help explain 
the gender achievement gap.  
Discrimination regarding activities that could be important to an 
employee’s advancement may not be covered by Title VII.  Advance-
ment in the workplace may depend on access to activities that build 
workplace camaraderie, engender familiarity among staff, signal that 
an employee is a team player, and provide face time with an employ-
er’s decision-makers.  Invitations to meals, trips with high-level man-
agers, and other activities may be opportunities for employees to get 
to know managers in a manner that will become relevant when discre-
tionary decisions regarding advancement are made.  These “reindeer 
games,” as Professor Theresa Beiner has called them, can become 
quite important to an employee’s advancement.37  They also are gener-
ally not covered under Title VII, even when the opportunities are pro-
vided discriminatorily.38  Shutting women out of the reindeer games 
may not violate Title VII because not sharing those opportunities 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court:  Common Law Judging Versus 
Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 301–02 (2006) (discussing 
grants of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases). 
 36 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  
 37 See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions, or Privileg-
es of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643 (1996). 
 38 When the reindeer games create a hostile work environment, they should be actionable.  
See id.; Tristin K. Green, Discrimination In Workplace Dynamics:  Toward a Structural Account of 
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003). 
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equally with women may not qualify as sex discrimination with re-
spect to an employee’s TCP of employment.  However, when those 
reindeer games become part of a decision-making process that limits 
an employee’s advancement, non-compensable discrimination—the 
refusal to provide equal access to reindeer games—may harm an em-
ployee’s advancement.39  When the discriminatory limitation on partic-
ipation in reindeer games falls more heavily on women, it can help 
perpetuate the achievement gap. 
The coverage gap even extends to substantive discrimination.  Ti-
tle VII covers sex discrimination, i.e., behavior that occurs because of 
sex.40  However, Title VII does not necessarily cover behavior that oc-
curs because of some characteristic that is merely related to sex.41  For 
example, pregnancy discrimination was deemed not covered by Title 
VII in the mid-1970s.42  Title VII was amended in 1978 to make clear 
that pregnancy discrimination was to be considered sex discrimina-
tion.43  Somewhat similarly, the debate about sexual orientation dis-
crimination continues.  Sexual orientation discrimination is related to 
sex discrimination.  However, courts have determined that sexual ori-
entation discrimination is not sex discrimination under Title VII.44   
A focus on whether conduct is “pure” sex discrimination can be 
problematic when behavior is related to sex but can be thought not to 
be “pure” sex discrimination.  For example, behavior that is not explic-
itly sexually discriminatory, but could have been influenced by sex, 
may not be considered sex discrimination under Title VII.  If such be-
havior becomes a factor in a discretionary decision that harms an em-
ployee’s TCP of employment, the employee may be without recourse.  
How some courts have addressed animus illustrates the point.   
An employee who is disliked by an employer and is therefore 
passed over for a promotion may not have a claim under Title VII, if 
the animus is personal.  Conversely, if the animus is fueled by the em-
                                                                                                                           
 39 However, this could be deemed  the  use of discretion that damages women’s advance-
ment prospects rather than an attempt to do so.  See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart 
Stores v. Dukes:  Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 258-59 
(2012) (discussing discretionary promotions policy in Wal-Mart v. Dukes litigation). 
 40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 41 However, Title VII can be interpreted to cover circumstances where considerations of 
sex are part of a larger employment decision.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989) (ruling that employment decision based on sex stereotyping can constitute sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (ruling that employ-
ment rule that disqualifies women with school-age children from job that men with school-age 
children can hold is discriminatory).  
 42 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 43 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 44 See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2009); Medina v. Income 
Support Div., New Mexico, 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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ployee’s sex, it is sex discrimination.45  Though making that distinction 
may be difficult, some courts seem to suggest that differentiating per-
sonal animus and discriminatory animus can be relatively easy.46  In 
those courts, an employer/supervisor who displays animus toward a 
female employee and harms her TCP of employment as a result can-
not be found liable under Title VII for those actions unless the animus 
is proven to be sex-based.47  Proving to such courts that an individual 
employment decision hinged on sex-based animus may be difficult 
without significant additional evidence of sex-based animus.  Unfortu-
nately, judges who are skeptical of employment discrimination cases 
may dispose of cases that lack additional evidence on summary judg-
ment even when a jury might infer that the animus is sex-based.  Of 
course, if the animus really cannot be proven to be sex-based, a judg-
ment for the employer may be proper under Title VII.  Nonetheless,  if 
women are more likely to be subject to generalized animus in the 
workplace, the inability to rectify that animus may help explain an 
achievement gap that Title VII does not and will not fix.  
Title VII has been of great value to women and to the workplace 
in general.  It covers a significant amount of workplace discrimination.  
However, it explicitly does not bar all workplace discrimination or all 
behavior that can limit or harm an employee’s advancement in the 
workplace.  If women remain more likely to be subject to unlawful 
discrimination and to lawful discrimination that is not addressed by 
Title VII, men will tend to progress in the workplace more quickly 
than women of the same skill.  That can help explain and perpetuate 
the gender achievement gap in the workplace.  
IV. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ON TITLE VII CAUSES OF ACTION 
As the prior section suggests, Title VII’s scope is limited by its ex-
plicit terms.  However, in some instances, courts have interpreted Title 
VII in a manner that limits recovery even when its explicit terms 
might allow recovery.  Two such areas are sexual harassment and retal-
                                                                                                                           
 45 In an era of unconscious bias, the distinction between personal animus and discriminato-
ry animus can be difficult to make.  See Eva Paterson, Kimberly Thomas Rapp & Sara Jackson, 
The Id, The Ego, And Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building Upon Charles Lawrence's 
Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1187-
88 (2008) (discussing unconscious racial animus). 
 46 See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993) (noting and sanctioning 
district court’s distinction between personal animus and discriminatory animus). 
 47 See, e.g., Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2000) (discuss-
ing when personal animus does and does not equate to discriminatory animus); see also Sanches 
v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 
F.3d 156, 165-66 (5th Cir. 2011) (differentiating personal animus and sex-based animus). 
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iation.48  In those areas, the limitations on recovery may limit the ad-
vancement of women and help preserve the achievement gap.  
A. Sexual Harassment 
Title VII remedies a significant amount of sexual harassment.49  
However, sexual harassing conduct is non-compensable in two in-
stances.  First, sexually harassing conduct may not be considered seri-
ous enough to be actionable.50  Second, sexually harassing conduct that 
is actionable sexual harassment may be subject to an affirmative de-
fense that absolves the employer of responsibility.51   
Two forms of actionable sexual harassment exist under Title VII:  
harassment that causes actual job detriment and harassment that does 
not cause actual job detriment.52  Historically, the forms have been 
denoted “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” harassment, 
respectively.53  Though those terms have fallen somewhat out of favor 
recently, they are used in this article for ease of reference.54  Quid pro 
quo harassment is harassing conduct undertaken because of the em-
ployee’s sex that explicitly alters an employee’s TCP of employment; it 
is always compensable under Title VII.  A prototypical quid pro quo 
claim can consist of the following:  a demand for sexual favors by a 
supervisor, a subordinate’s refusal of the demand, and the firing of the 
subordinate.  Actual job detriment must occur and must be causally 
related to the harassing conduct.55  For example, a supervisor’s demand 
for sexual favors coupled with the subordinate’s refusal of the demand 
is not considered quid pro quo harassment until the subordinate suf-
fers actual job detriment.56  Until actual job detriment occurs, the su-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REV. 
1591 (2000) (discussing limitations of sexual harassment law); Charles A. Sullivan, Raising The 
Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499, 537 n.164 (2010) [hereinafter Rais-
ing the Dead?]. 
 49 For a discussion of the breadth of sexual harassment law, see generally, Chambers, supra 
note 48. 
 50 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (“For any sexual harass-
ment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe 
or pervasive.”); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (“Of course . . . not all work-
place conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of 
employment within the meaning of Title VII.”); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 
(1993) (discussing limit of hostile work environment harassment). 
 51 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 52 For a general discussion of hostile work environment harassment, see id. at 751-53. 
 53 Id. at 751. 
 54 Indeed, the Ellerth Court essentially abandoned the terms as it discussed the terms’ 
genesis. See id. at 753. 
 55 See Chambers, supra note 48, at 1611-16 (discussing quid pro quo claim).   
 56 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. 
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pervisor’s behavior will be analyzed as hostile work environment har-
assment.   
Hostile work environment harassment is harassing conduct un-
dertaken because of the employee’s sex that constructively alters the 
terms, conditions or privileges of an employee’s employment.  To be 
actionable as hostile work environment harassment, the sexually har-
assing conduct must be severe or pervasive, objectively offensive to a 
reasonable person, subjectively offensive to the employee, and unwel-
come.57  The severe or pervasive requirement is based on the belief 
that relatively low-level or relatively infrequent sex-based harassment 
may not constructively alter the TCP of an employee’s employment.58  
The objective offense requirement is an attempt to guarantee that a 
supposedly overly sensitive employee cannot claim harm when other 
reasonable employees would not.  The subjective offense requirement 
is based on the notion that an employee who is not personally offend-
ed by the harassing conduct cannot have suffered a constructive alter-
ation of the employee’s TCP of employment.  The unwelcomeness 
requirement exists to guarantee that the employee does not enjoy the 
harassing conduct, as courts posit could theoretically be the case when 
the harassing conduct merely suggests sexual attraction – rather than 
sexual animus – on the harasser’s part.59   
A significant amount of harassing conduct may occur before it is 
actionable.60  Harassing conduct that falls short of hostile work envi-
ronment harassment is not compensable under Title VII.  Even if such 
behavior is not common in the workplace, leaving that behavior non-
compensable when it does arise in the workplace is problematic.  Al-
lowing harassing conduct to go unaddressed can be harmful if that 
allows the workplace to become sexualized up to a point just short of 
a hostile work environment.61  When such an environment is accepted 
and acceptable, the unwillingness to accede to harassing behavior that 
does not quite constitute actionable sexual harassment may mark an 
employee as a prude who is not sufficiently in tune with the workplace 
                                                                                                                           
 57 For general discussion of the requirements of an actionable hostile work environment 
claim, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile Environment, 
53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 740-43 (2002) [hereinafter (Un)Welcome Conduct].  
 58 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that Title VII is not to become “a general civility 
code.”  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 59 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (discussing the relationship 
between supposedly provocative dress and welcomeness of harassing conduct); Chambers, 
(Un)Welcome Conduct, supra note 57, at 746. 
 60 See Chambers, (Un)Welcome Conduct, supra note 57, at 751-57 (discussing cases in 
which sexually harassing conduct was not deemed actionable). 
 61 See Chambers, (Un)Welcome Conduct, supra note 57, at 783-84. 
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to be promoted.  If this situation tends to limit women more than men, 
it might help explain the achievement gap.   
Unfortunately, not only does Title VII allow some sexually har-
assing behavior to be rendered non-actionable because it has yet to 
cause sufficient harm to an employee, Title VII allows some actionable 
sexual harassment to be rendered non-compensable based on the Su-
preme Court’s installation of an affirmative defense.62  The affirmative 
defense exists ostensibly to make sure that the employer is not held 
responsible for sexual harassment when it would supposedly be unfair 
to do so.63  The Supreme Court created an affirmative defense that 
applies when a supervisor is responsible for harassing conduct that 
creates a hostile work environment.64  The affirmative defense allows 
an employer to avoid liability if the employer reasonably attempted to 
prevent or remedy the harassing conduct and the employee unreason-
ably failed to address the harassment to minimize its effect.65  The af-
firmative defense may be fair and defensible given that employers 
who attempt to prevent harassment may not be able to do so com-
pletely.  Providing an opportunity for such employers to avoid liability 
when a supervisor breaks company policy and an employee unreason-
ably fails to complain about the harassment may be fair.  Indeed, the 
affirmative defense provides employers the incentive to create serious 
complaint procedures that would trigger the affirmative defense.  That 
is laudable if the complaint procedures create a culture of compliance 
that lessens the incidence of workplace harassment.  However, even 
with such procedures in place, potentially harmful and non-
compensable sexual harassment may exist.  Indeed, the affirmative 
defense is not necessary until actionable hostile work environment 
harassment has occurred.  Proof of the affirmative defense may 
demonstrate that the employee could have sought to remedy or avoid 
additional harassment once harassment occurred, but did not.  How-
ever, it does not eliminate the existence of sexually harassing conduct 
in the workplace that may harm an employee’s advancement.  
The issue is even starker when the harassment is triggered by co-
workers or other non-supervisory personnel.  In that situation, the 
employer must be negligent in failing to prevent or address the har-
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
 63 See id. at 764 (noting that the affirmative defense was crafted to support Title VII’s goals 
of encouraging employers to be proactive in addressing harassment).  
 64 See id. at 765 (providing context for the affirmative defense). 
 65 See id. (“The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that 
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”). 
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assment to be liable.66  Again, this is not necessarily a bad or unfair 
standard.  However, it has the potential to leave significant harass-
ment non-compensable.  If such harassment tends to fall more heavily 
on female employees than male employees, that the harassment is 
non-compensable may help explain the achievement gap.    
Similarly, courts limit employer liability for the unofficial back-
lash that an employee may receive from fellow employees after chal-
lenging workplace sexual harassment.67  When fellow employees shun 
an employee who has complained, the employer may avoid responsi-
bility for the behavior of the fellow employees.  Given that Title VII 
addresses employer liability, this may be sensible.  However, the result 
may tend to discourage employees from complaining about sexual 
harassment until it becomes intolerable.  That may leave some tolera-
ble harassment unaddressed.68  Tolerable harassment can act as a 
headwind that female employees may disproportionately face.  Similar 
issues arise when courts address retaliation under Title VII. 
B. Retaliation 
Retaliation is different than most of the other issues this essay 
discusses because Title VII does not explicitly limit recovery to retalia-
tion that affects an employee’s TCP of employment.  Title VII simply 
prohibits retaliation.69  That would appear to allow courts to make eve-
ry instance of retaliation compensable.  However, courts have not 
done so.70  Some retaliatory conduct that could be covered by Title 
VII’s retaliation clause is not actionable.  If that style of retaliation 
falls more heavily on women than men, it could help explain the 
achievement gap.  
Title VII’s retaliation provision prohibits discrimination by an 
employer against an employee who has formally participated in an 
action alleging unlawful employment practices or who has informally 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (discussing negligence 
standard).  
 67 See Chambers, (Un)Welcome Conduct, supra note 57, at 785 (noting that reprisals may 
follow filing of harassment claim).  Indeed, retaliation cases can begin with a reprisal stemming 
from the filing of a sexual harassment claim. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 
548 U.S. 53, 58 (2006). 
 68 However, harassment need not necessarily cause serious emotional distress to be action-
able.  See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).  
 69 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employ-
er to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceed-
ing, or hearing under this subchapter.”).  
 70 See White, 548 U.S. at 60-61 (discussing how trial and appellate courts had addressed and 
limited Title VII retaliation claims).  
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opposed an unlawful employment practice.71  The retaliation provision 
does not require that the employer harm the employee’s employment; 
it bars discrimination based on the employee’s actions.72  The discrimi-
natory conduct is deemed retaliatory if there is a sufficient causal 
connection between the employee’s involvement in the challenge to 
the unlawful employment practice and the subsequent discrimination 
or differential treatment.73  Though Title VII’s text does not limit the 
retaliation that is covered, courts have.  
The Supreme Court set the limits of actionable retaliation in Bur-
lington Northern v. White.74  As the White Court noted, before White, 
courts had argued about the scope of the retaliation clause.75  Some 
had ruled that actionable retaliation had to be limited to retaliation 
that concerned serious employment decisions.  Other courts argued 
that retaliation had to be limited to retaliation that affected an em-
ployee’s TCP of employment.  Still other courts argued that retaliation 
should extend to any discrimination that might dissuade a reasonable 
employee from challenging the unlawful employment practice.76  The 
White Court embraced a relatively broad view of the retaliation clause 
and ruled that the clause covered retaliation that would dissuade a 
reasonable employee from challenging the putative unlawful em-
ployment practice.77  
Though the White Court’s decision was a victory for those who 
contemplated a fairly broad vision of retaliation, the decision did not 
expand the retaliation clause to cover all retaliation.  Retaliation that 
would not deter a reasonable employee from challenging the putative 
unlawful employment practice, but might cause harm to the employ-
ee’s employment, is not covered.  An employer can treat an employee 
who has challenged an unlawful employment practice badly, if the re-
taliation is insufficiently severe to deter the employee from challeng-
ing the unlawful employment practice.  That may be a reasonable in-
terpretation of Title VII.  However, it leaves some harmful retaliation 
non-compensable.   
                                                                                                                           
 71 Courts arguably have broadened Title VII’s coverage by deeming it to cover actions that 
employees reasonably believe to be unlawful employment practices.  Others argue that courts 
have not broadened coverage sufficiently because they may use the reasonable belief standard to 
limit retaliation claims. For a discussion of reasonable belief, see Richard Moberly, The Supreme 
Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375 (2010).  
 72 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 73 For a discussion of causation issues, see B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 
456-59 (2008). 
 74 See White, 548 U.S. at 67-68. 
 75 Id. at 57. 
 76 Id. at 60-61 (discussing state of the law prior to the White decision).  
 77 Id. 
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As importantly, co-worker retaliation is not compensable unless it 
can be attributed to the employer.  An employee who is shunned, in-
sulted or treated badly by co-workers after challenging workplace 
discrimination may have no recompense for that retaliation.78  The 
retaliation may be bad enough.79  However, the employee may face 
additional fallout when advancement opportunities become available.  
If an employee’s relationship with the employee’s co-workers is con-
sidered relevant to a promotion, the employee’s opportunities to ad-
vance may be affected by the initial decision to challenge the unlawful 
employment practice and the ensuing co-worker reaction.  The em-
ployer cannot decline to promote the employee because of the em-
ployee’s prior challenge to the unlawful employment practice, but can 
take co-worker opinion regarding the employee into account when 
making promotion decisions.80  Of course, even if the employee 
claimed that the promotion decision amounted to retaliation by the 
employer, the employee would need to prove that the promotion de-
nial was causally related to the prior challenge to the unlawful em-
ployment practice.  That can be difficult to prove given that courts 
suggest that even a short time lag can destroy the causal link between 
the challenge to an unlawful employment practice and an employment 
decision that an employee claims is retaliatory.81  
Retaliation and sexual harassment are covered by Title VII.  
However, both retaliation and sexual harassment have been interpret-
ed more narrowly than Title VII requires.  Though courts may be right 
to interpret Title VII fairly narrowly, narrow interpretations broaden 
the scope of workplace discrimination that is non-compensable.  If 
non-compensable behavior tends to harm women’s job prospects for 
advancement more than men’s, the lack of coverage for that behavior 
can help to explain the persistent achievement gap between men and 
women in the workplace. 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Johnson v. Weld Cnty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1216 (10th Cir. 2010); George, supra note 
73, at 482-83. 
 79 Retaliatory shunning is not uncommon.  See, e.g., Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1216; Brazoria 
Cnty., Tex. v. E.E.O.C., 391 F.3d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 80 Though the Supreme Court has determined that the ultimate decisionmaker need not be 
motivated by discrimination for its decision to be sufficiently influenced by another’s discrimina-
tory input to be actionable, see Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192-93 (2011), the appli-
cation of that principle from a USERRA case to a Title VII retaliation situation would likely be 
novel.  
 81 See, e.g., Gonzalez-Droz v. Gonzalez-Colon, 660 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that 
proximity in timing between retaliation and triggering action must be close to support inference 
of causation). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The persistence of the achievement gap between men and women 
in the workplace may be explained, in part, by the continued preva-
lence of sex discrimination in the workplace.  Title VII remedies much, 
but not all, sex discrimination in the workplace.  Title VII’s limited 
substantive coverage coupled with judicial interpretations that narrow 
its coverage help explain the gap.  Those interpretations leave women 
vulnerable to sex discrimination that might slow their progress in the 
workplace. If the harm from workplace sex discrimination that is not 
covered by Title VII falls more heavily on women, women have a 
headwind, either slight or severe, in the workplace.  If women and men 
provide work of equal quality, women will tend to advance more slow-
ly because of the headwind.  A resulting achievement gap is not sur-
prising.  
Unfortunately, larger problems may loom.  The existing gap may 
not be able to be closed even by the best and most aggressive en-
forcement of the employment discrimination laws.  Though Title VII 
may be expanded to cover additional forms of discrimination, Title 
VII is unlikely to be expanded to cover all workplace discrimination 
that could harm women’s advancement in the workplace.  Eliminating 
the behavior that leads to non-compensable workplace harm (or mak-
ing sure that the harm is equally distributed to men and women) may 
be the only hope of closing the gap.  Employers will need to address 
that issue on their own, assuming they want to solve it.  However, em-
ployers have always been free to solve workplace problems on their 
own.  That employers have not done so already might make some pes-
simistic about whether they will move in that direction fast enough in 
the near future to close the achievement gap.  
This brief essay is not meant to be a comprehensive exploration 
of the reasons that the workplace achievement gap between men and 
women exists.  For example, it does not discuss statutes other than Ti-
tle VII.  Indeed, it does not mention all of the discrimination that Title 
VII does not cover.  It does not analyze the effects of Title VII’s short 
statute of limitations and limited monetary recovery.82  It does not con-
sider how the EEOC may under-enforce Title VII.  This essay merely 
notes that Title VII is not an employment discrimination cure-all.  
Simply, Title VII – a principal statute meant to address sex discrimina-
tion in the workplace – does not provide recompense for some forms 
of harmful workplace discrimination.  That alone may help to explain 
the existence and persistence of an achievement gap.       
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Sullivan, Raising the Dead?, supra note 48. 
